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I. Introduction 
Anyone reading about the international financial institutions (principally the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) cannot help but be struck by the wide 
range of views expressed.  This is perhaps not surprising with respect to normative 
opinions, but almost equally wide is the range of positive assumptions about how these 
institutions behave and the effects of their policies.  Given the difficulties of interpreting 
the data thrown up by complex social interactions this might be excepted.  What is quite 
alarming, however, in the literature on the IFIs is the frequency with which writers ignore 
the vast range of disagreement and assume (usually implicitly) that one particular point of 
view is clearly correct.  Thus critics of the IFIs from the far right and the far left have 
become political allies, seemingly not noticing that each side has reached its position by 
making exactly opposite (and offsetting) positive and normative assumptions.  Thus 
while the far left sees and opposes the IMF as an agent of global capitalist interests, the 
far right opposes it instead as an agent of statism. 
Again we should perhaps not be surprised that political activists pay little 
attention that their positive analysis is completely at odds with that of those on the 
opposite end of the political spectrum.  When we turn to the academic literature, 
however, the state of analysis is not all that much better.  Many (indeed I suspect most) 
treatments of the political economy of the IFIs in the academic literature view them 
through one or at most two lenses, and in the latter case it is often only to contrast the 
author’s correct lens with a conventional wisdom based on some false lens. 
In part this may reflect professional incentives.  In both of the (partially 
overlapping) fields of public choice and of international political economy (IPE), the road   2
to quick recognition and advancement has been dominated by papers that advance 
innovative explanations that are contrasted favorably with some alternative.  This is 
certainly legitimate science, but we have reached the point when the generation of 
interesting hypothesis has greatly exceeded our knowledge about their empirical 
relevance.   
Of course collectively a good deal of empirical evidence – both quantitative and 
qualitative – has been presented.  Public choice research has established beyond a doubt 
that rent seeking in the public arena is important, but this is not the same as showing that 
it is everything.  In the early stages of the development of a theory or approach, it is quite 
appropriate to accept the standard showing that predictions of the analysis are consistent 
with important observations.  Only if the approach passes such plausibility probes should 
it begin to be taken seriously for real world applications.   
Public choice analysis has passed this stage with flying colors.  Too often, 
however, at least in applications in the areas of macro and international economic policies 
and monetary and financial institutions, public choice analysts have been content to 
remain at this stage.  Over time, however, such plausibility of probes should give way to 
critical experiments in which the criteria shifts from consistency of the theory with the 
data to the ability to explain or predict better than other theories or approaches.  In this 
regard it is not sufficient to contrast specific public choice or IPE theories only with 
public interest alternatives.  We have many specific theories within public choice – 
informed and uninformed median voter models, bureaucratic politics, etc - and we have 
massive amounts of empirical support for the propositions that all of these theories have 
some relevance and that none have complete explanatory power.  This suggests that in   3
most applications our focus should be on the comparative explanatory power of a number 
of factors, rather than assuming the power of one particular public choice or IPE theory.  
Furthermore, sometimes different hypotheses will be compliments rather than 
substitutes.
1   
In the more mature stages that public choice and IPE research are now entering, 
more attention needs to be focused on developing and testing contingent analysis that 
pushes our theoretical analysis deeper.  Such analysis should focus on the conditions 
most likely to affect the comparative explanatory power of primary factors or hypotheses 
across different issue areas, institutional arrangements, and specifics of economic and 
political conditions.
2  One purpose of this paper is to give an illustration of this type of 
analysis by considering the bureaucratic incentives for budget maximization across 
different types of institutional structures, specifically contrasting the IMF and the World 
Bank, organizations that are often lumped together in critiques of the IFIs. 
A second purpose is to focus on some methodological issues concerning the 
standards of evidence for testing public choice and IPE hypotheses.  These will be 
illustrated with respect to recent analysis of the IFIs by Roland Vaubel (1986), (1991) 
and (1996).  These examples were not selected because Vaubel’s analysis was 
particularly weak.  To the contrary, in terms of the quality of scholarly contributions to 
positive political economy analysis of the IFIs, Vaubel’s pioneering applications of 
public choice analysis must be give very high marks.  In his original contribution to 
public choice analysis of international organizations in general, Vaubel (1986) 
                                                   
1 I have argued in Willett (1989) that this is often the case in trade policy, where both strong lobbying 
positions and at least superficially plausible appeals to public interest arguments appear to be helpful in 
securing protection. 
2 See Dillon, Odell, and Willett (1991).   4
demonstrated how such organizations are likely to have an unusually high degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy due to the weak incentives for careful monitoring by national 
governments and the general public.  For similar reasons they are likely to be subject to a 
high degree of rent seeking from well organized special interests. 
Vaubel then went on in subsequent contributions to explore in more detail 
bureaucratic incentives for non public interest behavior at the IMF and World Bank.  He 
presented a hard-core version of public choice analysis in which considerable emphasis is 
put on bureaucratic incentives for budget maximization.
3  I have no doubts that such 
analysis has important explanatory power.  This paper will argue, however, that Vaubel’s 
analysis likely overstates the importance of such behavior, at least with respect to the 
International Monetary Fund. 
One part of the analysis is theoretical and argues that the incentives for budget 
maximization are likely to be considerably greater at the World Bank than at the IMF.  
The second part is methodological and empirical.  It argues that the evidence offered by 
Vaubel in support of his hypothesis is in fact much weaker than his discussions suggest.  
One major problem is that of observational equivalence.  Evidence consistent with 
Vaubel hypotheses in some cases are equally consistent with other hypotheses.   
An important issue here is differences in view about correct economic theory.  
Scholars often draw conclusions about positive policy economy from inferences based on 
particular economic theories.  When controversies about correct economic theory are 
recognized, sharp conclusions often disappear.  Other issues concern disputes over the 
                                                   
3 For discussion of the distinction between hard and soft-core public choice approaches see Willett 
(forthcoming).   5
appropriate characterization of the facts and the need to consider the magnitude of 
effects. 
The thrust of the available evidence does not undercut Vaubel’s central thesis.  It 
is important to consider bureaucratic behavior at the IFIs.  The evidence does suggest 
however, that in doing so we should investigate objectives beyond just budget 
maximization and integrate such analysis with consideration of major external influences 
on the IFIs. 
II. Differing Incentives For Budget Maximization Across Organizations: A 
 Comparison of Central Banks, the IMF, and the World Bank 
 
Public choice analysis provides a powerful search light for illuminating important 
aspects of the behavior governments and bureaucratic organizations, but we must not let 
this power blind us to the need to carefully investigate the particulars of each application.  
For example, despite the tendency of critics from both the left and the right to lump them 
together, the IMF and the World Bank are in many important respects quite different 
types of organizations.  Both the objectives of the staff and the monitoring capacity of top 
management and outside groups vary considerably across these institutions.   
In the early stages of public choice analysis, there was a quite understandable 
tendency for bureaucratic theory to replace the profit maximization assumption of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm with a budget maximization assumption for the objective 
of bureaucrats.  For managers in large private organizations, personal income, perks, 
power, prestige, and advancement are all likely to be frequently highly correlated with 
the size of budgets, personnel or sales and the budget maximization hypothesis has been 
shown to have considerable explanatory power in many contexts.  This is the approach 
taken by Vaubel in his analysis of the IFIs.  He argues that “bureaucracies are interested   6
in power, prestige, and amenities.  To achieve these objectives they try to maximize their 
budget, their staff, and their independence” (1996, p. 195).  Bruno Frey (1997) has 
recently argued, however, that “the public choice literature is rather mute on the question 
of how employees in an international organization use the leeway awarded them” (p. 
120).  He goes on to suggest that “international bureaucrats pursue those policies that 
give them most prestige and influence within the reference groups with which they are 
connected” (p. 121). 
There will be conflicts among at least some of the goals of maximizing budget, 
output, salary, and prestige.  Miguè and Bèlanger (1974), for example, suggest that 
bureaus are likely to trade off a smaller total budget against a greater discretionary 
budget.  As Ronald Wintrobe [1997] puts it in his recent review of modern bureaucratic 
theory, “What do bureaucrats want? Economists being who they are, the most common 
answer to this question has simply been ‘Mo’ money (a bigger budget).  However, as a 
general answer this appealing but simple idea has been largely discredited and more 
sophisticated answers have been developed (bigger discretionary budget, influence on 
public policy, power, or simply utility).”
4   
In the following analysis I will suggest that in some types of organizations Frey’s 
emphasis on prestige will generate greater incentives for bureaucrats to pursue Vaubel’s 
assumption of budget maximization than in others and that in this regard, Vaubel’s 
analysis will be a good deal more applicable for the World Bank than for the IMF.  In 
earlier work, Banaian et al (1998), Willett (1990), I argued that in the case of independent 
                                                   
4 With respect to the power of bureaucrats (agents) with respect to their principals, the early literature such 
as Niskanen (1971) assumed a high degree of autonomy for bureaucrats based largely on their control of 
information.  The recent trend in the literature, however, has been on the mechanisms of control by the 
principals, especially legislatures.   7
central banks, budget manipulation is likely to be a much less powerful motivation than 
for the typical government organization.  Power, prestige, and perks, yes - but these 
objectives are likely to require only a tiny fraction of the revenues generated as a by-
product of normal monetary operations.  Thus, while many governments face strong 
incentives to be concerned with the seigniorage raising effects of national monetary 
policies, central banks themselves typically will not.  The expenditures that directly affect 
the attraction of the job for central bankers will often be infra marginal with respect to 
total seigniorage revenues, i.e., they will be independent of changes in total revenues.  
That is definitely the case with respect to the Federal Reserve Board in the United States 
where often more than ninety percent of seignorage revenues are turned over to the 
federal government and there is no fixed ratio of funds kept by the Fed.
5 
In analyzing national and international monetary organizations, we need to 
carefully evaluate both the degree of discretion that bureaucrats have and the objectives 
which they seek to pursue with this autonomy.  As is emphasized in the growing 
literature on the political economy of central bank independence, the amount of effective 
autonomy enjoyed by national monetary officials varies tremendously across countries 
and time – depending both on formal institutional arrangements and a host of other 
factors.
6  In general we would expect international bureaucracies to have greater 
autonomy than national ones (see Frey [1997] and Vaubel [1986]), but this is also likely 
to vary considerably from one organization to another. 
I will argue that as a consequence of micro incentive structures, national monetary 
authorities should have much less interest in budget maximization than World Bank 
                                                   
5 See Banaian et al (1988). 
6 For recent discussions and references to the literature see Banaian et al (1995) and Cukierman (1992).   8
officials, with the International Monetary Fund falling into an intermediate category. 
Because of different communities of peers resulting in part from differences in the nature 
of their duties, monetary policy officials are likely to have less interest in budget 
maximization than the typical bureaucracy.  Monetary policy actions tend to be quite 
visible and attract a good deal of public attention in comparison with most decisions by 
governments and international organizations.  The most relevant peer groups of policy 
makers in the monetary area are likely to be leading public figures.
7  This is likely also 
true of the management and top staff of the IMF.  All but the very top World Bank 
officials are likely to have much less visibility, however, and thus will be inclined to 
define their relevant peer group much more narrowly.  As such their standing within the 
Bank is likely to carry much more weight in their utility functions than would be the case 
with monetary officials.  Consequently, budget maximization considerations seem likely 
to be of greater importance for the World Bank than for national monetary officials.   
An important part of the apparent tendency for most central banks to be relatively 
lean organizations in comparison with the average government organization has to do 
with the nature of their primary products.  Monetary policy has substantial elements of a 
public good and its necessary physical costs of production are quite low.  Most of the 
actual costs involve acquiring and evaluating information in order to try to improve the 
quality of decisions.  This is quite different from national defense where in addition to the 
costs of making informed decisions, there are typically substantial physical costs of 
                                                   
 
7 Of course some at all three types of organization will include academia as an important peer group.  My 
analysis would predict that the proportion doing so would be much lower at the World Bank then at the 
IMF and national central banks.   9
production, which give much greater scope for narrowly motivated rent seeking behavior 
(i.e., lets make sure that the defense plant in my district gets plenty of business.) 
Of course, central banks are not monolithic entities.  Bank supervision, as with 
many aspects of national defense, requires a great many more individual decisions than 
does monetary policy, and these decisions receive much less prominence.  Thus, we 
would expect to see a much greater role for budget maximization objectives in bank 
supervision divisions of the central banks than in their monetary policy divisions.  
Similarly, by the nature of their primary outputs, we would expect finance ministries to 
display less budget maximization behavior than commerce departments – again with the 
crucial caveat that there may be important variations over the different functions 
performed by each ministry. 
The number and visibility of individual outputs affects both the incentives of 
bureaucrats and the ability of top management or other overseers to monitor their 
behavior.  The difficulty of measuring the quality of output is also important.  Where this 
is high, there will be a greater tendency to monitor on the basis of more easily measured 
inputs.  The prevalence of many hard to measure outputs is particularly fertile ground for 
the relevance of the budget maximization hypothesis. 
In this regard, there is a clear progression as we go from national monetary policy 
makers to the IMF to the World Bank.  While national central banks have responsibility 
for making monetary policy for one country, the IMF has responsibilities for making 
recommendations about macroeconomic policies for many countries, as well as dealing 
with more specific policy issues involved with the operation of the international monetary 
system.  While the specific responsibilities differ, the environment of the IMF is much   10
like that of national central banks and finance ministries.  As such, there would seem to 
be relatively little incentive for key decision makers at the IMF to maximize staff size.  
Having a well paid, high quality staff is another matter. 
Where the IMF differs most importantly from national central banks is that a 
major part of its output is not just policy advice and international monetary agreements, 
but also loans to individual countries for balance of payments assistance and crisis 
management.  Here the incentives for non public interest bureaucratic behavior are much 
greater.  However, the strongest perverse incentives with respect to IMF loan programs 
may come from career enhancement incentives to not rock the boat and with excessive 
risk aversion toward the possibilities of currency crises than from motivation from budget 
maximization per se [see Willett (forthcoming)].  The relative importance of these 
different motivations is likely in turn to influence both the design of the best strategies for 
reform and the likelihood of effective implementation.   
As we turn from the IMF to the World Bank, both the incentives for materialistic 
rent seeking and the difficulties of monitoring increase.  While there has been increasing 
overlap of the activities of the two organizations over time there is still a great difference 
between the major outputs of the IMF and the World Bank.  The agenda of the World 
Bank is far broader and it makes many more micro level loans.  Most of the World 
Banks’ loans and offerings of policy advice have much less high-level visibility than do 
those of the IMF.  Doubtless many World Bank officials are attracted to the prospect of 
being able to do good for others, but the additional arguments in their utility functions 
appear likely to fit more closely with the assumption of traditional bureaucratic theory 
than do those of the typical central banker or IMF official.  The lower the level of the   11
decision maker being considered, the less are the likely differences in incentives for 
budget maximization across organizations.  There will remain, however, major 
differences across organizations in the degree of effective autonomy of these decision 
makers.  With its wider array of outputs and with the substantial difficulties of measuring 
the effectiveness of its programs, it is much more difficult for top management and the 
Executive Board to effectively monitor and control the actions of staff at the World Bank 
than it is at the IMF.   
III. Observational Equivalence and Other Methodological Issues 
One type of test considered by Vaubel involves looking at IMF strategies and 
policy recommendations to check their consistency with bureaucratic self-interest.  This 
is certainly a worthwhile approach.  It is important, however, to consider the consistency 
not only with one’s own hypothesis, but also with other possible interpretations.  This 
Vaubel usually fails to do.  A number of observations that he correctly concludes are 
consistent with his hypotheses are equally consistent with other interpretations – often 
including pubic interest behavior. 
One particular difficulty in this type of ‘testing’ is that the interpretations will 
often be heavily dependent about views of correct economic theory.  Indeed frequently 
evaluations will be of necessity tests of joint hypothesis about behavioral objectives and 
views of how the world operates (i.e. positive theory).  Often, however, those who use 
this approach slide over this problem, making implicit assumptions about correct positive 
theory.  Thus, for example, to critics from the far left who adopt Marxist or structuralist 
economic theory, the recessions that so often accompany the initiation of IMF programs 
are seen as clear evidence of the IMF’s capture by capitalist interest.  However to most   12
mainstream economists, this evidence would be perfectly consistent with a public interest 
interpretation, the recessions being a necessary short run price that must be paid in order 
to achieve long run economic stability. 
Vaubel criticizes the IMF for designing economic policy programs based heavily 
on discretionary fine-tuning as opposed to strict adherence to rules and quite correctly 
argues that this is consistent with the Fund’s bureaucratic interests.  This is a strong test, 
however, only if rules are clearly superior to discreation on public interest grounds.  
While Vaubel adheres to a school of macroeconomic thought which believes this to be 
the case, this is a subject of considerable controversy among macroeconomists.  Thus 
Vaubel’s observations of a preference for discretionary policy are equally consistent with 
bureaucratic self-interest and public interest behavior based on beliefs that the situation is 
too complex to handle via rules.
8  
 Another type of problem involves the characterization of facts, both of behavior 
and of effects.  Again, all too often, the facts presented are not sufficiently documented 
and sometimes even professional controversies about the facts fail to be noted.  This 
problem occurs often with respect to statements about the effects of IMF programs as the 
differences in view of the left and right illustrate.  It also sometimes fits characterization 
of the types of policies advocated by the IMF.  Vaubel argues that “Since the Fund is 
interested in large foreign exchange interventions, it tends to favor a system of exchange 
rate parities with narrow margins” (p. 195).  One can indeed point to many examples that 
fit this hypothesis, but there are many other cases that do not.  In fact, the IMF is well 
                                                   
8 For arguments that the situations faced by the IMF are typically too complex for rules to be efficient see 
Eichengreen (1999).   13
known for advising many developing countries to adopt more flexible exchange rate 
regimes.   
The IMF does not offer monolithic advice on exchange rate regimes.  Nor need 
this involve inconsistency since the major insight of the theory of optimum currency area 
is that the balance of costs and benefits of different exchange rate regimes may vary 
systematically across countries.  Thus it may be best for one country to have fixed rates 
and another flexible.  Apart from particular country circumstances, the IMF’s general tilt 
toward pegged versus flexible exchange rates has fluctuated overtime as has the majority 
of opinion within the academic profession.  And as with the latter, at any point of time, 
there is considerable dispersion of views among the Fund’s management, senior staff, and 
members of the Executive Board.   
At the present time, it is difficult to determine the Fund’s overall tilt.  The 
extensive surveying done for the recent external evaluation of the Fund’s surveillance 
policies reported numerous complaints of perceived Fund bias toward pegged rates but it 
also heard many complaints of bias toward flexible rates (see IMF 1999a). Certainly 
desires to generate more business for itself cannot have dominated the IMF’s advice on 
exchange rate policies in recent years. 
IV. Loan Pushing and the Effectiveness of IMF Programs 
Another example of bureaucratic behavior given by Vaubel is the traditional low 
interest rates on IMF loans.  This is consistent with bureaucratic incentives for loan 
pushing, it could also reflect public interest motivation of the IMF’s stock holders to 
provide aid to developing countries which represent most borrowings from the IMF.  
(That this probably would not be a first best form of aid is a different issue).   14
Charges that bureaucratic incentives to keep the loan funds flowing have resulted 
in insufficient stringency in the IMF’s policing of its policy conditionality are also 
difficult to evaluate.  Incentives for such behavior certainly exist and a number of writers 
from the right have viewed it as almost self evident that IMF funding has 
overwhelmingly tended to retard rather than promote adjustment.
9  Writers on the left 
tend to believe just the opposite, however.  They charge the IMF with promoting poverty 
through excessively harsh adjustment programs.
10  However, defenders of the Fund can 
point to cases where IMF programs have indeed helped promote desirable adjustment 
policies.   
As experience with IMF programs has been quite varied, representatives of each 
of these points of view can point to specific cases that support their beliefs.  There have 
been a number of more systematic studies of IMF programs, but they still leave an 
extremely broad gray area open to conflicting interpretation.
11  This is hardly surprising, 
given both the broad range of disagreements about what economic policies would be in 
the public interest and the difficulties of judging the counterfactual of what policy would 
have been in the absence of the IMF program.  The studies do show overwhelmingly that 
the initial stated objectives of IMF programs are seldom met, but this does not tell us 
much about whether policies were better than they would have been in the absence of a 
program.  Likewise, as Krueger (1997, p. 36) notes, “judging whether policy reform was 
pushed ‘hard enough’ is problematic.” 
                                                   
9 See, for example, the contributions in Badow and Vasquez (1994) and McQuillan and Montgomery 
(1999).  
10 As Krueger (1997, p. 17) notes, “most critiques of the Fund centered on its conditionality…as being too 
harsh.” 
11 For recent contributions and references to the literature, see Bird (1996), Killick (1995), Killick et al 
(1998), Ul Haque and Kahn (2000). 
   15
The studies also show that contrary to the strongest forms of bureaucratic capture 
allegations,
12 the IMF has been willing to pull the plug on a substantial number of 
programs.  Thus despite the bureaucratic incentives to push loans, there must also be 
some strong countervailing incentives.  Important here are the personal incentives of top 
IMF officials to be concerned with the IMF’s reputation.  This reflects not only the 
officials’ concerns with their own reputation, but also the emphasis placed by the Fund 
and its share holders on its catalytic role as a signaler for private capital flows.  This 
provides the Fund with incentives to worry about reputation.  Furthermore, as Bird 
[1998] emphasizes, within a principal agent framework the Fund has incentives to use 
conditionality to signal to its shareholders that it is being a good agent.
13 
There is reason to question whether such incentives have been sufficient to keep 
the credibility of IMF programs from declining over time.
14  For example, many of the 
programs pulled by the Fund are started again soon after with little apparent penalty.  
Whatever its' bureaucratic incentives for loan pushing, the Fund’s share holders have 
managed to exercise sufficient control to sharply limit the aggregate growth in the IMF’s 
lending capacity.  Fischer [1999] points out that as a proportion of world GDP Fund 
quotas have fallen by over ninety percent.  Economies of scale in the demand for 
international reserves and the virtual cessation of borrowing from the IMF by the 
industrial countries would tend to reduce the size of the need for increases in IMF quotas, 
but the rapid growth of international capital mobility would cut in the opposite direction.  
No such adjustments, however, would change the qualitative conclusion that growth of 
                                                   
12 See, for example, Sadler et al (1995). 
13 For an alternative principal-agent analysis where the IMF is treated as the principal and borrowing 
governments as the agents, see Killick (1996). 
14 See, for example, Bird and Rowlands (1997) and Willett (2000a).   16
IMF quotas and hence the IMF’s lending potential has been far less than the growth of 
the world economy.   
Further evidence on the limited success of loan pushing comes from judgements 
that many countries tend to come to the Fund too late rather than too early.
15  This 
suggests through revealed preferences that the policy conditionality of Fund programs 
was considered to have enough bite that these costs to national sovereignty and decision 
making freedom were perceived to be more than sufficient to offset the subsidized rate of 
interest on IMF loans.
16   
There is, however, evidence consistent with gaming on the part of the IMF that 
does not appear to be consistent with public interest interpretations.  Vaubel [1991, 1996] 
finds evidence of hurry up lending in advance of reviews of quota increases.  This is 
consistent with the old bureaucratic maxim that failure to spend all of the old budget 
makes it more difficult to get increases in the new budget.  It is hard to think of a public 
interest interpretation that would fit this pattern.
17  However, once we recognize that there 
may be more than one set of considerations at work, we should pay attention to the size 
as well as the existence of evidence supporting the operation of bureaucratic or other 
                                                   
 
15 See, for example, Bird (1996).  There in fact appears to be two quite different types of borrowers from 
the Fund that exhibit quite different types of behavior.  One type uses the fund sparingly if at all and sees 
high political and/or economic costs to accepting Fund program.  The other type becomes hooked on IMF 
funding.  James Vreland (1999) suggests that these distinct types of behavior can be explained in terms of a 
high fixed political cost of agreeing to a Fund program. 
16 There are good reasons for the recent move to increase the charges on IMF loans, but public choice 
analysis suggests that this will have relatively little effect on behavior since we would expect public 
authorities with some degree of discretion to be much less concerned with the level of interest costs than 
would the typical private economic agent.  The recent push by developing countries to block increases in 
the charges on IMF loans clearly shows that their governments are not indifferent to the interest rates they 
are charged, but given a tradeoff between the level of interest costs and the severity of constraints on their 
behavior, we would expect governments on average to choose positions less skewed toward low interest 
costs than private agents. 
17 This also applies to findings that fluctuations in the stringency of IMF conditionality are pro-cyclical.  
See, for example, Bird (1996).   17
biases.  I have no quarrel whatsoever with Vaubel’s evidence that there is an element of 
hurry up lending in the behavior of the IMF.  What I find most interesting, however, is 
that Vaubel’s numbers suggest that the magnitude of this effect is rather modest.  
Vaubel’s table shows that the average increases in the third and fourth years of the quota 
cycle are only 4.2 percent and 3.6 percent respectively.  These increases are indeed 
greater than the average increase in the first two years (which is slightly negative), but the 
amount of increase seems rather small.  Although Vaubel does not present tests of 
statistical significance, I would not be surprised if these differences were significant at 
conventional levels.  I would interpret Vaubel’s results, however, as suggesting that hurry 
up lending at the IMF appears to be a minor rather than a major problem.   
V. Staff Size and Salaries 
Whether we can say that the IMF staff is not just well paid, but also overpaid is 
not as easy as it might first appear.  As Vaubel (1991) documents, IMF staff earn a 
substantial premium compared with staff at the Federal Reserve Board and U.S. federal 
government employees in the Washington, D.C. area.  This would also hold with respect 
to academic economists.  The argument that IMF staff are not overpaid must rest with 
comparisons with private financial institutions.  Enough Fund staff leave for such jobs 
that this comparison is not entirely spurious. 
It should be added that while Fund staff do received many non-pecuniary benefits, 
most are worked quite hard.  Indeed, concern with excessive workloads was expressed by 
the team of outside experts that recently reviewed the Fund’s research activities (IMF 
1999b).  While critics often refer to foreign travel by the Fund’s staff as an additional 
benefit, many at the Fund wish that they could get away with going on fewer foreign   18
missions.  Traditionally the U.S. government, in part responding to Congressional 
concern, has tried to hold down the size of pay increases at the IFIs, but with only modest 
success.  All in all, it is probably fair to conclude that the IMF management and staff 
have been pretty successful in looking out for their own narrow pecuniary interests, but 
not by so much as to make the supply of applicants for Fund jobs virtually perfectly 
elastic as Vaubel (1996) suggests.
18  In terms of overall policy implementation, it should 
also be remembered that salaries are a relatively small part of the IMF’s total budget. 
The prediction made in Section II that the World Bank will have more 
bureaucratic flab than the IMF fits well with the qualitative judgements of close 
observers of the two institutions.  For example, the Bretton Woods Commission [1994], a 
set of blue ribbon leaders from the academic, policy, and financial communities, depicts a 
bloated staff at the World Bank in contrast with a lean high quality staff at the IMF.
19 
Vaubel (1996) finds that the size of the staff has grown more rapidly at the World 
Bank than at the IMF (6.8 percent per annum versus 4.3 percent over the period of 1955 
to 1994).  IMF staff growth, however, was higher than for the BIS (2.2 percent) and the 
OECD (2.1 percent).  It is not clear a priori, however, whether any of these growth rates 
are too high or too low relative to the tasks that the organizations are being asked to 
perform.   
Some argue that the IMF lost its purpose after the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods adjustable-peg exchange rate regime in the early 1970s and should have been 
                                                   
 
18 It should be qualified that given understandable limitations on the country composition of Fund staff, the 
supply from a number of countries is likely perfectly elastic over a substantial range, but not for many of 
the industrial countries. 
 
19 In an article highly critical of the IMF Minton-Beddoes (1995) also argues that the IMF is not 
overstaffed.   19
abolished.  Hence its growth rate should be strongly negative.  Such arguments are based, 
however, on a lack of appreciation of the full range of roles that the IMF was designed to 
play.  The IMF certainly has been keen to throw itself into new tasks such as dealing with 
the international debt crisis and the economic transitions of the former communist 
countries,
20 just as any bureaucracy theorist would expect.  And in each case some critics 
have argued that the IMF had no business taking on these new tasks.  Unfortunately from 
the standpoint of clear-cut testing, there are also many experts who argue that it was in 
the public interest for the IMF to take on these tasks. 
While I have no doubts that threats to survival of the institution would provoke as 
strong a bureaucratic response at the IMF as at any other institution, there is also clear 
evidence that the IMF’s moves into new areas also reflected pulls from its major 
shareholders.  Thus it would be no easy task to sort out the relevant magnitudes of agent 
push and principals pull in these episodes.  Likewise one can plausibly argue that the 
complexity of today’s international financial issues are much greater than they were 
during the Bretton Woods era.  Thus a plausible case could be made that if anything, the 
IMF is under rather than overstaffed.
21 
Recognition of the differences in the nature of the types of loans they provide is 
important for attempts to produce quantitative measures of productivity at the IMF and 
World Bank.  Vaubel [1996] presents measures of productivity at these organizations 
based on the number of credits approved per year divided by the number of staff.  While 
                                                   
 
20 See, for example, Henning (1996) and James (1996). 
21 For arguments that the IMF needs to expand its staff capabilities in the area of political economy 
analysis, see Willett (2000b).  Financial sector analysis is another area in which there has been a strong 
need to expand IMF staff capabilities.  Of course, it is a separate issue whether such expansions should be 
matched by cutbacks in other areas.  There is evidence however, that overwork has had serious adverse 
effects on the IMF’s research efforts.  See IMF (1999).   20
noting that the number of credits “is a somewhat imperfect proxy because it captures 
neither the quality of the distribution and design of the credits, nor supplementary 
services like the provision of information and advice.” (p. 196) Vaubel fails to note that 
the macro nature of the IMF’s mandate implies that it will be making many fewer loans 
than the World Bank, while still having substantial responsibilities for the provision of 
information and advice.  The resulting comparative productivity figures are highly 
misleading.  For 1994 Vaubel’s table shows the World Bank as being two and a half 
times more productive then the IMF.  (The numbers for 1955 show the World Bank as 
being more than eight times more productive).  While Vaubel does not explicitly address 
comparative productivity at the two institutions, such numbers can give a highly 
misleading impression of the degree of bureaucratic efficiency of the two organizations. 
Vaubel (1991, 1996) also presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the 
size of the IMF’s staff is unresponsive to need, thus suggesting a great deal of 
bureaucratic autonomy.  It is extremely difficult, however, to construct a good empirical 
proxy for the demand or need for IMF services.  As a consequence, it is not surprising 
that Vaubel does not find significant coefficients on his need proxy.  This result is equally 
consistent with the bureaucratic autonomy hypothesis and with the poor proxy 
hypothesis.  While the R
2’s of the equation are extremely high, this appears to be due 
primarily to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.  Thus, the power of the test to 
discriminate among hypotheses is quite low.  It is a quite legitimate exercise for a 
plausibility probe, but not for a critical experiment.  In the mature stage of public choice 
analysis, all tests should include discussion of their power – not just in the formal   21
statistical sense – but in terms of their likely ability to discriminate among alternative 
relevant hypothesis. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Roland Vaubel has performed a valuable service in highlighting the role that 
bureaucratic incentives can play in influencing the behavior of the IFIs.  This is a healthy 
antedote to both the traditional public interest treatments of international organization by 
many economists and some international relations scholars and the dominant realist view 
in international relations that views international organizations as having little autonomy 
and influence. 
We need to push beyond Vaubel’s analysis, however, to incorporate a broader 
range of considerations.  I have suggested that the bureaucratic incentives for loan 
pushing and maximizing staff size are likely to be considerably less at the IMF than at the 
World Bank.  This supports Bruno Frey’s (1997) suggestion that we need to pay greater 
attention to the study of the objectives of international organizations. 
We also need to pay more attention to the relative importance of various external 
influences.  It is not difficult to establish that major financial institutions have more 
influence on IMF both directly and indirectly through the intermediation of national 
governments than does say the agricultural lobby or the typical voter.
22  We also have 
many examples, however, where the IMF fails in its role as lackey to big finance.  The 
recent emphasis by the Fund on the need for greater private sector burden sharing during 
international debt crisis is an important case in point.  Thus developing even a rough idea 
of how much the Fund has catered to financial special interests will not be an easy task.  
                                                   
22 For recent quantitative studies of the influence of financial interests and US political interests on IMF 
policy, see Gould (2000), Stone (2000), and Thacker (1999).   22
But it is important.  The same will hold for the influence of US foreign policy concerns.  
There is strong evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, that the US often has a strong 
influence on IMF policy, but the US does not always get its way.  There is a lot of 
important political economy research to be done. 
Moving to a higher level of public choice analysis is likely to stimulate some 
cognitive dissonance.  Easy answers and comforting certainties will be found far less 
frequently.  Much of our analysis will have to become more nuanced and tentative.  We 
would have to face more explicitly the vast amount that we do not know and accept a 
much wider range of grey areas in which the available evidence is not conclusive.  We 
will likewise have to invest more time in learning the particulars of a situation before we 
can offer analysis with confidence.  We cannot safely assume that a bureaucracy is a 
bureaucracy is a bureaucracy and that all political and economic systems operate in the 
same way.  Abandoning plausibility probe stage for the richer world of contingent 
analysis and critical experiments will not be entirely comfortable, but the power of public 
choice analysis deserves no less.   23
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